



Despite the likely declassification of the Senate report on CIA’s
practices, the U.S. government still maintains vast capabilities
to spy on its own citizens.
Last week the Senate Intelligence Committee voted to declassify parts of its controversial report
into the CIA’s practices in the aftermath of 9/11. Allison Stanger warns against interpreting this
and the likely termination of the collection of telephone meta-data as the beginning of the end of
the U.S. surveillance state. She argues that most of the emergency measures that quickly
became business as usual during the Bush Administration are still on the books, and that these
will still allow the government to track the communications of Americans abroad, as well as their
Internet traffic that is not based in the U.S.
The Senate Intelligence Committee voted on April 3 to declassify portions of its 6,300 page report on the CIA’s
detention and interrogation practices during the George W. Bush administration. The report is said to expose
“brutality that stands in stark contrast to our values as a nation,” according to a written statement from the
Committee’s chairwoman, Senator Diane Feinstein, and to reveal that the CIA misled the public about the
effectiveness of its extreme methods.  Acknowledging the excesses of the previous administration, however
praiseworthy, does little to address the larger reality:  The Obama administration continues to support many
practices put in place by its predecessors that effectively cordon off large segments of executive branch activity
from public scrutiny.
It is hard to imagine President Obama not approving the report’s declassification. He has said he wants the
findings of the report to be made public and as a candidate opposed the CIA’s enhanced interrogation tactics,
which included depriving suspects of sleep for days at a time, slamming them against walls, and waterboarding
them.  The report is said to dispute the claim that these brutal methods produced any vital intelligence
breakthroughs.  That finding would coincide with the conclusions of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board (an
independent, bi-partisan agency within the executive branch), whose January 2014 report concluded,
“We have not identified a single instance involving a threat to the United States in which the
telephone records program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism
investigation. Moreover, we are aware of no instance in which the program directly contributed to
the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack.”
But what of the overwhelming majority of wartime emergency programs initiated after 9/11 that the Obama
administration has allowed to continue, prompting Bush Press Secretary Ari Fleischer in 2013 to claim that
Obama was “carrying out Bush’s 4th term”?  Whatever one may think of the intelligence contractor turned leaker
Edward Snowden, his revelations unveiled the vast surveillance state that 9/11 unleashed. Snowden’s
documents, taken as whole, revealed no less than a complete transformation in NSA operating procedures after
9/11.  Prior to that date, the NSA’s awesome power was explicitly not to be directed at US citizens.  After
President George W. Bush’s secret executive order of October 2001, NSA protocol flipped from targeted
searches (search then seize) to dragnet searches (seize then search under approved conditions). What began as
wartime emergency measures following an attack on American soil became the new normal.  In President
Obama’s words, “It is hard to overstate the transformation America’s intelligence community had to go through
after 9/11.”
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Congress’s 2001 Patriot Act and the 2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) then
sanctioned the NSA’s permanent transformation as legitimate and legal. The Patriot Act lowered the barriers to
legal surveillance by allowing the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review requests to suspend
privacy rights. The Surveillance Court only hears arguments from the Justice Department and not opposing
views, and Chief Justice Roberts has unilateral power to select its members.  The determination of whether or not
an individual’s right to privacy should be upheld is made behind closed doors and beyond public scrutiny—until
Snowden forced those choices into public view.
Section 215 of the Patriot Act authorized dragnet surveillance of the telephone records of American citizens, the
collection of meta-data about which other numbers a person calls, for how long, and how frequently, not the actual
contents of private conversations.   That program is likely to end soon, as it has been criticized from all points of
the political spectrum, and President Obama announced his intention to do so in his January 17 NSA speech.
 Federal judge Richard J. Leon of the District of Columbia has deemed NSA collection of American telephone
records likely to be unconstitutional; “James Madison would be aghast,” he pronounced. Another federal judge,
however, has deemed the practice in keeping with the Constitution, making Supreme Court consideration of the
issue likely. Section 215 is up for renewal by Congress in June 2015, and it is hard to imagine, given the
controversy the program has generated, that a majority of Congress would choose to associate itself with the
program’s continuation.
While ending the telephone metadata program would be a step in the right direction away from the wartime
emergency measures that have become America’s business as usual, it will hardly put a dent in the national
security surveillance state. Section 702 of the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act allows the
government to track the Internet communications and phone calls of foreigners who are “reasonably believed to
be located outside the United States” with permission from the secret FISA court.  If Americans are at one end of
the communication, their electronic utterances can be legitimately monitored.  Since many Internet
communications cannot be situated geographically and often pass through fiber-optics cables located outside the
United States, Section 702 provides legal cover for expansive snooping.  For example, the NSA obtained data
from Google and Yahoo by tapping fiber-optics cables on British territory.
To date, the US government has assumed that American citizens would trust them not to abuse these privileges.
 Yet when such a vast zone of secrecy persists, and technology has outstripped our laws, that trust becomes
misplaced.  “Given the unique power of the state,” President Obama has himself warned, “it is not enough for
leaders to say: Trust us. We won’t abuse the data we collect. For history has too many examples when that trust
has been breached.”  If the telephone dragnet surveillance program comes to an end as anticipated, the green
light to monitor e-mail, social media, and phone calls will persist in programs sanctioned by 702. To quote the
President himself again, “Our system of government is built on the premise that our liberty cannot depend on the
good intentions of those in power. It depends on the law to constrain those in power.”
Former CIA and NSA director Michael Hayden recently accused chairwomen Feinstein of being too “emotional” in
her condemnation of CIA enhanced interrogation practices, questioning the objectivity of the report she seeks to
declassify.  He meant it as a put-down. Yet despite the insistence of intelligence officials, no convincing evidence
has been presented that torture produced results, and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that it did not. 
Perhaps a bit more emotion in response to the trampling of American values and human rights in the name of
security is precisely what American democracy now needs to correct its own excesses.
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